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Cashing in on Older Workers:
Age Discrimination Claims in CashBalance Pension Plans
Coleman J.F. Cannon*

Introduction
"The assets of private [pension] plans, estimated to be in
excess of $130 billion, constitute the only large private
accumulation of funds which have escaped the imprimatur of
effective federal regulation."1
In 1974, Congress passed and President Gerald Ford signed
into law the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). 2 Federal regulation finally placed its imprimatur on
American corporate pension funds. 3 Today, the assets of corporate
and public sector pension funds approach $5 trillion.4 Besides
ERISA, various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")5
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")6
regulate pension plans. Together ERISA, the IRC and the ADEA
abuses that plagued the private
have prevented many of the
7
pension system prior to 1974.
* J.D., M.A. expected 2002, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1996, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. For their comments on earlier drafts of this article, the author
thanks Carousel Andrea Bayrd, Professor Karen C. Burke, Kevin M. Bloss,
Benjamin Felcher, Mark A. Hamre, Nina Moriji-Azad, Mark Schroeder, and Kere
Valent.
1. S. REP. No. 92-1150, at 3-4 (1972) (discussing the Retirement Income
Security for Employees Act of 1972).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.).
3. The signing, on Labor Day, Sept. 2, 1974, took place almost ten years after
the release of PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAM: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS BY THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT AND
WELFARE PROGRAMS (1964), and more than seven years after the introduction of

the first pension reform bill that the report prompted. See DAN M. MCGILL ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 34 n.3 (7th ed. 1996).
4. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF
FUNDS ACCOUNTS: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FIRST QUARTER 2000, at 111 (2000).
5. I.R.C. §§ 72, 401-404, 412, 501 (1994).

6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
7. Although federal law regulated pensions via the tax code prior to 1974,
protections for individuals were not the focus of the regulation. See infra note 81.
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Today, a new design of pension plans endangers the hardwon protections that pension beneficiaries enjoy.8 In 1996, the
IRS first recognized what it referred to as a "pension plan that
defines benefits for each employee by reference to the amount of
the employee's hypothetical account balance." 9 The plan design, a
hybrid of defined benefit and defined contribution pension plan
types, is more popularly known as a cash-balance pension plan.' 0
Because of their structure, cash-balance plans have the potential
to devalue older employees' current benefits as well as reduce their
Recently, IBM
future benefit accruals until retirement.
Corporation's plan conversion raised the ire of older employees,
prompting talk of unionization drives at some plants." IBM's
conversion plan also drew criticism from the media and
government officials. 12 Despite the negative reaction, employers
continue to convert their plans to combat rising benefit costs and
13
to cater to the typical worker of increasingly short tenure.
This Article will argue that cash-balance pension plans
circumvent the protections intended to be provided by existing
laws. Part I outlines traditional employer-sponsored pension
plans and the ways in which cash-balance plans alter the basic
framework.
Part II examines the three major legislative
provisions, ERISA, the IRC and the ADEA, and how they address
the discrimination issues that cash-balance plans raise. Part III
uses this legal background to critically evaluate the adequacy of
existing legal provisions to address the aspects of potential
inequality in cash-balance plans. Conversions to cash-balance
plans enable employers to evade the policies of ERISA, the IRC
protections for individuals were not the focus of the regulation. See infra note 81.
Similarly, it was not until 1990 that the ADEA, despite being first passed in 1967,
explicitly protected pension beneficiaries from age discrimination. See infra notes
139-140, 147-148 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
10. See Douglas Tokerud, New on the Pension Scene: The Cash-Balance Plan,
COMP. & BEN. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 33, 33; see also infra note 26 (discussing the
difference between defined benefit and defined contribution pensions). Because
this Article primarily appraises cash-balance plans, the term "pension" is used
throughout to refer to defined benefit plans.
11. See Diane E. Lewis, Change in Pension Plan Stirs Union Talk at Big Blue,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1999, at G1.
12. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Companies Cash in on New Pension Plan, But
Older Workers Can Face Penalties,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1999, at Cl. Rep. Bernie
Sanders of Vermont maintains an Internet site devoted entirely to the controversy
surrounding IBM's plan conversion. See Rep. Bernie Sanders, IBM Cash Balance
Pension Plan,at http://bernie.house.gov/pensions (last visited September 13, 2000).
13. See Fran Hawthorne, Why Designer Pensions Are in Fashion,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1, 1992, at 123, 124.
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and the ADEA because most of the provisions of the three are
inadequate in the context of cash-balance plans. The cash-balance
plan is a pension innovation that reduces employer benefit costs,
but does so at the expense of older workers.
I.

Pensions-Then and Now
A. A Brief History of Pensions

Employer-sponsored pensions are a relatively recent14
innovation in corporate employment in the United States.
Though the first plans appeared in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, the most significant growth in the number of
plans has occurred since World War 11.15 Since then, pensions
have become an essential source of retirement income for
Americans.1 6 Notwithstanding retirees' reliance on Social Security
benefits, personal savings and part-time employment, employer-7
sponsored pension plans are a major source of retirement income.'
The tremendous size of pension funds underscores their central
18
place in the employer-employee relationship.
14. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 20. In 1875, American Express was the first
to sponsor a large-scale industrial pension plan. See TERESA GHILARDUCCI,
LABOR'S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 14 (1992).
In 1912 Montgomery Ward created the first comprehensive plan, including life and
disability insurance. See id. Montgomery Ward's early sponsorship is noteworthy,
as today it is one of many employers seeking to convert to a cash-balance plan. See
infra note 73.
15. See GHILARDUCCI, supranote 14, at 75. The "welfare capitalism" movement
of the 1920s, which sought to inhibit union organizing and reduce turnover, was a
driver of pension plan growth. See id. at 14. Efforts to circumvent World War II
wage controls through deferring pay as pensions also played a role in the rise of
employer-sponsored retirement benefits. See id. at 36. The War Labor Board's
15% cap on wage increases as a means of reigning in inflation did not include
employer contributions to pension funds in calculating violations. See id.
16. Though compensation is most often thought of in terms of an hourly wage
or annual salary, the importance of pension benefits to the value of total
compensation cannot be overestimated. In 1996, all employee benefits combined
constituted almost 41% of total payroll for the average company, with retirement
benefits making up over 6%. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS: THE HIDDEN PAYROLL: A STUDY OF BENEFITS PRACTICES AND COSTS OF A
CROSS-SECTION OF AMERICAN FIRMS 13 (1997).

17. The combination of Social Security, personal savings and private pensions
is often referred to as the "three-legged stool" of American retirement policy. See
KAREN FERGUSON & KATE BLACKWELL, PENSIONS IN CRISIS 6 (1995); see also
Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriageof Retirement Security and Tax Policies,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857 (1987) (discussing the "tripartite system" of national
retirement security policy).
18. Pension funds are often regarded as the largest accumulation of private
capital in the country. See FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supra note 17, at 137.
Pension funds represent a large portion of national savings. Stanford University
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Employers sponsor pension plans for a variety of reasons.
Tax benefits are one major motivation. If pension benefits are
viewed as a deferred wage, 19 contributions to a pension plan give
employers a significant tax advantage because contributions to the
fund are a tax deductible business expense and investment
returns on the fund are not taxable. 20 In the past, commentators
considered employer benevolence at least partially responsible for
pension sponsorship. 2 1 More commonly, however, pension plan
sponsorship results from the employer's need to both attract and
retain talented, loyal employees, 22 and encourage older, less
Finally, employers have
productive employees to retire. 23

economist John B. Shoven estimates that fund contributions accounted for all of
national savings during the 1980s and accounted for more than 17% of national
wealth by 1990. See JOHN B. SHOVEN, RETURN ON INVESTMENT: PENSIONS ARE
How AMERICA SAVES 26, 29 (1991). Pension funds are a major force in the stock
market with more than two-fifths of the funds' money invested in corporate equity.
See id. Thus, pension funds own more than a quarter of corporate America. See id.
Pension fund dominance in U.S. securities markets has arisen largely since 1950,
with funds holding less than 1%of corporate equity and less than 15% of corporate

bonds prior to

1950.

See RICHARD

A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 4 (1986). Pension fund control of capital, however, faces criticism on a
number of fronts. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm:ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. &
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (discussing agency costs associated with separating
ownership, as represented by the pension fund, and control, as represented by the
managers of the companies in whose shares the fund invests); Mark J. Roe, The
Modern Corporationand Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75, 84 (1993) (citing
CEOs' reluctance to compel pension fund activism as contributing to general
shareholder passivity).
19. See GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at 2-3; see also RONALD G. EHRENBERG &
ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 278-79

(6th ed. 1997) (arguing that increased pension costs resulting from regulation will
reduce cash wages in competitive labor markets).

20. See PAUL P.

HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 8-9 (1959);

MCGILL, supra note 3, at 24-25; see also infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text
(discussing the IRC's treatment of pension fund contributions and investment
returns). Tax advantages accrue not only to the employer but also to the employee.
Pension savings are not taxable to the employee until payment is made, thus
avoiding the "double taxation" of taxable wages and taxable interest income on
savings. See IPPOLITO, supra note 18, at 7.
21. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., INDUSTRIAL
PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1925).
22. See MERTON C. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 11 (1964);

MCGILL, supra note 3, at 24; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra
note 21, at 25-26.
23. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 10; GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at 9
(intoning that pensions are for workers who are "too old to work, too young to die");
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 21, at 28. One court
referred to "an industrial old age... an economic human obsolescence, entirely
distinct from the evening of life." Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878,
879-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937). The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
pension, though only age fifty-two, because he had served the company for more
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sometimes sponsored plans in an effort to stave off drives for
unionization. 24 While pensions provide important benefits to
employees, employers also have self-regarding incentives to
sponsor plans. 25
B. CalculatingBenefits
Most defined benefit pension plans pay benefits based on a
formula that includes a figure for average pay over an employee's
tenure and years of service. 26 The benefit is typically composed of
a percentage of pre-retirement compensation that accrues for each

than twenty-seven years, and was engaged in an occupation in which "mature
youth would be at a premium" and that the plaintiff "had reached a point where a
younger man would serve [his employer] much more satisfactorily." Id. at 878-80.
Faced with an aging workforce and labor shortages, however, today's employers are
increasingly seeking ways to retain their older workers. See Arie Halachmi,
Dealing with Employees over Fifty: Reflections and an Introduction, 22 PUB.
PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 6, 7-9 (1998); Charlene Marmer Solomon, Unlock the
Potential of Older Workers, PERSONNEL J., Oct. 1995, at 56, 56. There is at least
some evidence that traditional stereotypes about older workers are waning. See
Barbara L. Hassell & Pamela L. Perrewe, An Examination of Beliefs About Older
Workers: Do Stereotypes Still Exist?, 16 J. ORG. BEHAV. 457, 457 (1995).
24. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 11. Indeed, pressure from unions already
representing workplaces is credited with pushing employers to sponsor plans. See
MCGILL, supra note 3, at 25. Research shows that, on average, union members are
more likely to be covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan than non-union
members. See IPPOLITO, supra note 18, at 189.
25. Regardless of their reasons for sponsoring pension plans, most employers
communicate frustration at navigating the intense and disjointed maze of pension
regulations. See Linda Thornburg, The Pension Headache, HRMAG., Jan. 1992, at
39, 39; see also infra Part II (discussing the pension regulations of ERISA, the IRC
and the ADEA).
26. See IPPOLITO, supra note 18, at 191. Pension plans are divided into two
broad categories: defined benefit and defined contribution. Defined benefit plans
pay a specific benefit that is calculated according to a formula that includes pay
and years of service. See FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supra note 17, at 16-17.
Employers who sponsor defined benefit plans bear the responsibility of contributing
to a pension fund and managing its investments in such a way that all promised
benefits can be paid out of the fund. See id. In defined contribution plans,
employers contribute a specified amount to employees' accounts and employees
bear the responsibility of managing the funds in such a way as to maximize their
return. See id. A popular variety of defined contribution pension is the 401(k)
plan, which takes its name from the IRC section that enables its creation. See id.;
I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994).
While cash-balance plans exhibit qualities of both defined benefit and
defined contribution pensions and are sometimes referred to as "hybrid" plans, they
are wholly defined benefit plans in nature. See Lindsay Wyatt, 'Hybrid' Plans for
Evolving Workforce, PENSION MGMT., Mar. 1996, at 12, 12; I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 19961 C.B. 359; see also MCGILL, supra note 3, at 297 (noting that hybrid plans are
typically "repackaging of one plan type so that it looks like the other"). Other
hybrid plans include pension equity and floor plans. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at
302-05 (discussing the mechanics of such plans).
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year of credited service.27 For example, a plan might pay an
employee 1% of his average pay over his career for each year of
service. 28 More commonly, average pay is based on the final five or
ten years of service, so as to most closely approximate the pay in
the years closest to retirement. 29 This benefit amount is then paid
out as a lifetime monthly annuity. 30 In order to receive payments,
plan participants must be vested, meaning that they must fulfill a
minimum number of years of service before receiving benefits. 3 1 In
place of the annuity, some plans allow beneficiaries to receive a
lump-sum payment at retirement.3 2 Similarly, some plans allow
workers who end their employment before retirement age to take a
lump-sum payment based on the present value of their expected
33
lump-sum benefit at retirement.
27. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 27. The plan sponsor will define the
percentage that accrues based on the percentage of pre-retirement income that the
sponsor seeks to replace during retirement. See id.
28. See id. at 203-04. The nature of a defined benefit plan means that
employers contribute to and invest the pension fund such that these benefits can be
paid when they come due. See id. at 27. While some plans may pay a flat dollar
amount per year of service, more than two-thirds of plan participants in a recent
survey were covered by plans that use earnings-based formulas. See U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1991, at 79 (1993).
29. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 204. For example, in a 2% final average pay
("FAP") plan, an employee with thirty years of service and a FAP of $60,000 will
receive a pension benefit that is 2% of $60,000 multiplied by thirty years of service.
This yields a lifetime annuity of $36,000, or $3000 per month, and replaces roughly
60% of pre-retirement income.
30. See id. at 213. An annuity is a stream of periodic payments. See GERHARD
G. MUELLER & LAUREN KELLY, INTRODUCTORY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 21 (3d ed.
1991).
31. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 107. Vesting is usually five years, meaning
that employees who leave before reaching five years of service forfeit their pension
benefits. See id. Some plans allow partial vesting, whereby a participant earns a
right to a percentage of her pension, perhaps 20% per year, until fully vested. See
id.
32. See id. at 223. The lump-sum is the "actuarial present value" of the
retirement benefit, where actuarial value is defined as "the benefit amount (1)
multiplied by the probability on which the benefit payment is conditioned [which in
most cases is the survival of the pension beneficiary] and (2) discounted at a
stipulated rate ... of interest." Id. at 503. Probability, in this case, is equivalent to
life expectancy, which is quantified using compilations of death rates at stated ages
called mortality tables. See id. at 506.
Similarly, some plans may allow for early retirement benefits commencing
before the normal retirement age of sixty or sixty-five. These benefits are also
actuarially reduced such that early retirees receive a payment whose present value
is equivalent to that of the benefit they would have received at the normal
retirement age. See id. at 215; see also Edward P. Lazear, Pensions as Severance
Pay, in FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE U.S. PENSION SYSTEM 57 (John Shoven et al.
eds., 1983) (examining early retirement benefits that exceed the present value of
future benefits).
33. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 215. The concept of present value assumes
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Regardless of whether a lump-sum option is available, the
prevalence of final average pay plans 34 demonstrates the
importance of pension beneficiaries' earnings late in their
careers. 35 This is consistent with retaining loyal and productive
employees for long terms of service. 36 Increasingly, however, the
emphasis on final average pay is giving way to a new model.
C. A Changing Workforce, a Changing Model
Today, the traditional model of employer-sponsored defined
benefit pensions is somewhat of an endangered species among the
various types of retirement plans. Changes in the economy and
the workforce have altered the format of plans that employers find
meet their dual goals of minimizing costs and attracting desired
employees.3 v While traditional defined benefit plans still exist, the
number in existence has been static for many years.3 8 In addition
to relying more on defined contribution plans,3 9 many employers
are moving away from the traditional model and toward the cash40
balance model.

that a stated amount of money payable in the future is equivalent to some smaller
amount payable today, making the lump sum payable at early retirement a lesser
amount than that payable at retirement. See MUELLER & KELLY, supra note 30, at
20.
34. Most defined benefit pension plans are of the FAP variety. See supra note
28, at 79.
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 43, 68-71 and accompanying text.
38. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a gradual decline in the number of
employees covered by defined benefit pension plans since 1980. See U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, supra note 28, at 79. Indeed, the fact that many plans still exist, despite
zero growth, is chiefly attributable to the tremendous regulatory hurdles plan
sponsors must navigate to terminate a plan and liquidate its funds. See infra note
89 (discussing ERISA's plan termination provisions).
39. Employers report that the defined contribution plan, mostly of the 401(k)
variety, is the most popular type of retirement plan. See U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 16, at 28.
40. See Hawthorne, supra note 13, at 123. Estimates of employers choosing to
convert to cash-balance plans range from 300 to 900. See id. (citing 300); Christine
Williamson, Up, Up and Away: Cash Balance Catches Fire,PENS. & INV., May 31,
1999, at 20, 20 (citing 900). The trend has been widespread, involving more than
twenty of the Fortune 100 companies, and affects unionized employers and those in
the public sector. See Birmingham Mulls Cash Balance Plan, PENS. & INV., Nov.
16, 1998, at 37, 37; Ricki Fulman, AT&T Unions Move to Cash Balance Plan,PENS.
& INV., June 15, 1998, at 4, 4; Terry Williams, Hybrid Pension Plans Dominate
Public Sector: Separate Trend Favors More DC Plans, PENS. & INV., Sept. 6, 1999,
at 24, 24; IBM Announces Plan Conversion, Offers Transitional Benefits to
Employees, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), at D4 (May 7, 1999), available at Westlaw,
5/7/1999 PBD d4.
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Unlike the traditional model, cash-balance plans define their
benefits not in terms of a retirement annuity, but rather as a
lump-sum amount. 41 Cash-balance plans make a "contribution" to
the employees' account on a regular basis, 42 and the account
balance grows at a stated rate of interest. 43 The account, however,
is simply a record-keeping device. 44 A plan sponsor still pays for
benefits out of one pension fund, but the account mechanism is
used to show employees how their pensions grow while they are
working. 45 If an employee has met the vesting requirements when
she ends her employment, the balance of the account is hers to
take with her. 46 Thus, instead of averaging pay in the later, more
lucrative years of employment as most traditional defined benefit
to accrue a
pensions do, 47 cash-balance plans require employees
48
flat percentage of pay annually over their careers.

41. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 297.
42. See Plan Administration: Hybrid Pension Plans Compared to Traditional
Defined Benefit Plans,PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), at D3 (June 22, 1995), available
at Westlaw, 6/22/95 PBD d3 [hereinafter Plan Administration]. In the former,
growth is a reflection of actual earnings whereas in the latter, growth is simply a
product of the plan formula. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 297; see also supra note
26 (discussing the differences between defined contribution and defined benefit).
43. For example, a typical plan might pay 4% of an employee's annual salary
and credit the account with interest tied to some benchmark interest rate, such as
that on thirty-year Treasury Bonds. See Plans Draw Both Praise,Criticism, PENS.
& BEN. DAILY (BNA), at D9 (Mar. 5, 1999), available at Westlaw, 3/5/1999 PBD d9.
Note that the 4% of salary is not a contribution that the employee makes but
rather, the amount by which the account balance, exclusive of compounded
interest, grows annually. The fixed percentage of pay, in contrast to the traditional
model's emphasis on final average pay, results in lower average benefits and
therefore lowered costs for employers. See supra note 29 and accompanying text;
Hawthorne, supra note 13, at 123. In "frontloaded" plans, interest is credited to the
account until the benefit is paid, regardless of whether the beneficiary remains
employed with the plan sponsor. See I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, 359-60.
In "backloaded" plans, interest accrual ends when employment ends. See id. at
360-61.
44. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 297; Plan Administration, supra note 42, at
D3.
45. See Plan Administration, supra note 42, at D3. In theory, the sum of the
hypothetical accounts should equal the assets of the fund. See Plans Draw Both
Praise,Criticism,supra note 43, at D9.
46. See Plans Draw Both Praise, Criticism, supra note 43, at D9. Unlike the
methods for calculating a lump-sum payment discussed above, see supra notes 3233, the lump-sum value may or may not be equal to the account balance. In
frontloaded plans, the lump-sum payment is the present value of the hypothetical
account balance calculated with interest credits up to the normal retirement age.
See I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, 360-61. In backloaded plans, the balance is
equivalent to the lump-sum payment. See id.
47. See supra notes 29, 34 and accompanying text.
48. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 297.
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The two tables below 49 illustrate the differences in benefit

accrual between cash-balance and traditional FAP plans. In Table
1,50 the figures for the average present value of cash-balance and
FAP benefits illustrate the differences in accrual patterns
discussed above.5 1 While younger workers, those below age fiftyfive, accrue more under the cash-balance plan, those over age fiftyfive accrue significantly more under the traditional FAP plan.
This disparity is most evident in the percentage of final average
pay that the expected pension benefit represents. For all ages
through age fifty-five, the cash-balance benefit replaces a larger
percentage of final average pay than does the FAP benefit.
Beyond age fifty-five, however, the FAP benefit replaces more.
52
Because plan benefits also vary based on years of service,
3
Table 25 summarizes expected benefits for various service
amounts both at ages before and after retirement.5 4 For all
workers in the group eligible for retirement at termination, the
FAP benefit exceeds the cash-balance benefit. The value of the
benefit as a percentage of final average pay is also higher in this
category. The opposite is true for those terminating before
retirement. For this group, the cash-balance benefit exceeds the
FAP benefit both in dollars and as a percentage of final average
pay.

49. Carol Quick, Overview of Cash Balance Plans, 8 ACA J. 24, 24-25 (Fourth

Quarter 1999).
50. See id. at 24. The figures are based on a study of 250,000 pension plan
participants between 1989 and 1995. See id. at 25. The second and third columns
represent the present value of expected future benefits. For a discussion of the
concept of present value, see supra note 33.
51. See supra notes 26-36, 41-48 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 26, 43 and accompanying text.
53. See Quick, supra note 49, at 24-25.
54. The figures presented represent averages for the various levels of service
both for "retirees," those over age fifty-five, and "terminations," those whose
employment ends at age fifty-five or younger, presumably before eligibility for a
pension benefit. See Quick, supra note 49, at 24-25.
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Table 1: Comparison of Present Value of Benefits in Cashbalance and Final Average Pay Plans
AVERAGE PRESENT

PRESENT VALUE AS A

VALUE OF:

PERCENTAGE OF
FINAL PAY:

AGE

CASHBALANCE

FAP
BENEFIT

FINAL
AVERAGE

CASHBALANCE

FAP
BENEFIT

PAY

BENEFIT

<26
26-30

$ 4,568
8,490

$464
1,151

$19,644
29,379

23.3%
28.9

2.4%
3.9

31-35
36-40
41-45

13,169
19,046
26.563

2,399
4,785
9,129

35,406
38,271
39,879

37.2
49.8
66.6

6.8
12.5
22.9

46-50
51-55
56-60

34,206
45,925
55,200

16,140
41,176
83,272

41,311
41,272
40,334

82.8
111.3
136.7

39.1
99.8
206.5

61-65
>65

55,831
55,622

89,302
78,382

37,963
37,313

147.1
149.1

235.2
212.7

BENEFIT

Table 2: Comparison of Present Value of Benefits in Cashbalance and Final Average Pay Plans for Terminations and
Retirees
AVERAGE PRESENT

PRESENT VALUE AS A

VALUE OF:

PERCENTAGE OF
FINAL PAY:

SERVICE

CASH-

FAP

FINAL

CASH-

FAP

BALANCE
BENEFIT

BENEFIT

AVG.
PAY

BALANCE
BENEFIT

BENEFIT

$ 23,063
40,571
58,102

$36,187
35,322
36,563

31.3%
60.1
88.3

63.7%
114.9
158.9

74,828
124,338

36,710
41,727

120.9
205.8

203.8
298.0

retirees (age 56 and older)
5-10
$11,322
21,237
11-15
32,291
16-20
21-25
>25

44,379
85,870

terminations (age 55 and
younger)
5-10
11-15
16-20

10,319
25,379
34,710

3,141
8,032
15,090

34,718
37,832
39,644

29.7
67.1
87.6

9.0
21.2
38.1

21-25
>25

49,736
72,916

25,974
53,456

41,600
44,241

119.6
164.8

62.4
120.8
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D. Making the Change

Because most employers deciding to offer cash-balance plans
already maintain traditional defined benefit plans, 55 establishing
the new plan requires converting the existing plan benefits to the
new plan.5 6 The two major issues in conversion are calculating
starting balances for current employees and whether to allow some
employees to remain in the old plan.5 7 Both issues relate to the
treatment of participants in the old plan and implicate the major
differences between traditional defined benefit pensions and cash58
balance plans.
First, cash-balance plan sponsors must decide how to
establish an opening account balance for participants in the
existing traditional plan.5 9 Most often, the new plans will use the
present value of the accrued pension benefit under the existing
plan as the opening balance in the new plan. 60 Alternatively,
employers may calculate balances as though the cash-balance plan
had always been in effect.6 1 In such a case, older employees whose
benefits under the old plan exceed those under the new plan will
retain their accrued benefit under the old plan as the opening
account balance. 62 A key feature of this option is the "wear-away"
provision. For an employee whose accrued benefit becomes the
opening account balance, the new plan need not credit the account
until the benefits under the new plan exceed, or "wear-away" those
63
under the old.
Plan sponsors also face the issue of transitional benefits, or
whom to allow to remain in the old plan under "grandfather"
provisions. 64 Because older employees will accrue less under the
new plan, 65 setting the cutoff age for transitional benefits too high
has the potential to reduce benefits for those beyond the age and

55. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 301.

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.; Hawthorne, supra note 13, at 127; see also supra note 33 (discussing
the concept of present value).
61. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 301.
62. See Lawmakers Ask IRS to Stop Issuing Determination Letters for Cash
Balance, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), at D4 (July 16, 1999), available at Westlaw,
7/16/1999 PBD d4.
63. See id.; I.R.S. News Release IR-99-9 (Oct. 19, 1999), available at 1999 WL
956732; infra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing legal basis for "wearaway" provisions).
64. See MCGILL, supranote 3, at 301.
65. See supra note 43.
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tenure where cash-balance is less lucrative than traditional
pensions. 66 Commonly, those within five years of retirement may
67
retain benefits under the old plan.

Despite the issues that transitions raise, several factors have
spurred employer interest in establishing cash-balance plans.
Cash-balance plans are more attractive to younger workers than
traditional defined benefit plans. The new plan design also allows
employers to reduce aggregate pension expenditures. Because the
plans pay younger workers the same benefit-a percentage of
salary-as older workers, the plans allow short-tenure employees
to quickly accrue valuable benefits. 68 The lump-sum payment
feature common
to most cash-balance plans also enhances their
"portability. 69 This feature is particularly important to employers
with a mobile and global workforce. 70 The change in the benefit
formula also enables employers to reduce their benefit costs.

71

The

existence of the fictional account makes it easier for employers to
communicate the plan provisions and personalized benefit
calculations to their employees.7 2 Finally, increased merger and
acquisition activity has made cash-balance plans a popular means
73
of restructuring workforces.
66. See Hawthorne, supra note 13, at 124.
67. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 301. Realizing that some employees will

always lose no matter where the age cutoff is placed, Honeywell, Inc. gave all
employees the choice of which plan to participate in after its recent move to a cashbalance plan. See Michael R. Bonsignore & Brent Bowers, Of Me' and 'We'
Moments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at C12.
68. See Hawthorne, supra note 13, at 124. Hawthorne points out that the plans
have also benefited the increasing numbers of part-time workers in the labor force.
See id.
69. See Susan Barreto, A Common Plan: BPIntends to Lead Amoco to the Cash
Balance Altar, PENS. & INV., Aug. 23, 1999, at 1, 1. "Portability" refers to
employees' ability to transfer their pension benefits when changing jobs. See id.

70. See Kevin Dent, Benefit Provision for Internationally Mobile Employees,
BEN. & COMP. IN'L, June 1, 1998, at 15, 15-16; Simon Wasserman, Cash Balance:
An InternationalPerspective, 30 CoMP. & BEN. REV., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 29, 29. The
World Bank recently replaced its traditional defined benefit plan with a cashbalance plan for its multinational employees. See Vinetta Anand, World Bank

Changes Plan:Employees Get Investment Choice, Sponsor Gains Arbitrage, PENS. &
INV., Apr. 20, 1998, at 2, 2. The plans are equally attractive to labor-intensive
employers and those with high rates of employee turnover such as banks,
universities and hospitals. See FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supranote 17, at 68.
71. See Hawthorne, supra note 13, at 123; see also supra note 43 (discussing
cost savings associated with cash-balance plans).

72. See Williamson, supra note 40, at 20.
73. See Harold W. Burlingame & Michael J. Gulotta, Case Study: Cash Balance

Pension Plan FacilitatesRestructuringthe Workforce at AT&T, 30 CoMP. & BEN.
REV., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 25, 25; Wards to Cash Balance, PENS. & INV., July 12,
1999, at 1, 1. According to one estimate, mergers and acquisitions rose from 3,385
in 1983 to 9,124 in 1995, changing in value from $96.2 billion to $453.3 billion. See
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Together, these factors have made converting to a cashbalance pension plan a strategic business decision for many
employers. Such a strategic decision, however, is not made in a
regulatory vacuum. Multiple forms of federal legislation regulate
the contours of employer-sponsored pensions.
II. The Legal Landscape
Three distinct but overlapping legislative provisions regulate
Various aspects of pension mismanagement
pension plans.
contributed to the passage of each law. A discussion of the current
regulatory state of pension plans lays the groundwork for the legal
labyrinth through which cash-balance plans must maneuver.
A. ERISA
In the first half of the twentieth century, the growth of
pension coverage, the increase in financial influence wielded by
pension funds, and innovations in plan design brought the need for
legislative oversight and judicial interpretation of pension plan
Disputes between unions and employers as to
provisions.7 4
whether pension plan provisions were a mandatory subject for
bargaining led to early judicial recognition of the importance of
pensions.7 5 Such recognition, however, would not prevent ongoing
abuses in the private pension system.
1. The Need for Pension Reform
In spite of the advantages that employers saw in offering
pension plans to their employees, 76 they did not always uphold the
promises they made to provide future benefits.7 7 The failure to
THE 1997 INFORMATION PLEASE BUSINESS ALMANAC 237 (1996).

Notable among

these, cash-balance plans played a role in the Amoco-British Petroleum merger, see
Barreto, supra note 69, at 1, the NationsBank-BankAmerica merger, see Vineeta
Anand, Bank Plan Blurs Line Between DB, DC, PENS. & INV., Sept. 21, 1998, at 1,
1, the Compaq-Digital merger, see Barry B. Burr, DEC, Compaq Fund Issues
Complicated, PENS. & INV., Feb. 23, 1998, at 3, 3, and the Allied Signal-Honeywell
merger, see Bonsignore & Bowers, supra note 67, at C12.
74. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1949)
(upholding the NLRB's decision that pensions were a condition of employment in
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act despite arguments that pensions
are not adaptable to bargaining). In its own opinion, the NLRB casually mentioned
but did not examine the fact that the plan required retirement of all employees by
age sixty-five. See In re Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948); see also infra note
138 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the ADEA on mandatory
retirement).
76. See supranotes 22-25 and accompanying text.
77. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 638 (1994).
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pay promised benefits was due to national economic trends 78 and
employer malfeasance.7 9
These abuses prompted increased
attention to pension practices, then legislative action to remedy
the problems.8 0
ERISA's legislative history demonstrates the role of such
abuses in motivating the law's passage and courts' treatment of it
intention.8 '
legislative
this
reinforces
enactment
since
Establishing minimum and reliable standards for plan vesting
requirements and insuring plans against unfunded liabilities were
both central to the design of ERISA's provisions.8 2 The statute

78. The Great Depression caused many plans to fail in the 1930s, leaving
employees without the benefits they expected. See id. at 637. Into the 1960s, plan
sponsors continued to fund their plans inadequately, which meant that plan assets
were not always sufficient to pay promised benefits. See id. at 638. An anemic
stock market in the 1960s and 1970s also coincided with an increase in pension
terminations. See GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at 102; see also supra note 18
(discussing pension fund dominance of the U.S. stock market).
79. See GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at 145. Employers often terminated
healthy plans at will, leaving current and future pension recipients with little
explanation as to why their benefits were terminated. See id. Most notably, in
1963, the Studebaker Company closed its plant in South Bend, Ind., laying off 7000
men and women. See FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supra note 17, at 3; see also Leigh
Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporationand Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 145,
145-81 (1994) (discussing the impact of the Studebaker plan termination). The
closure resulted in the termination of not only promised pension benefits for
current employees, but also the end to benefits already being paid to retirees. See
GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at 133. Ironically, Studebaker's pension plan booklet
promised employees the ability to "settle down on a farm [or] visit the country or
just take it easy... and know that you'll still be getting a regular monthly pension
paid for entirely by the company." FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supra note 17, at 3
(internal quotations omitted). The Pension Restoration Act of 1991, an amendment
to the Older Americans Act Reauthorization, would have paid benefits to those
whose pensions were lost due to pre-ERISA abuses, most of whom were former
Studebaker employees. See GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at 182 n.1 (1992). The
bill was thought too expensive and never passed. See id.
80. See GHILARDUCCI, supra note 14, at x; see also supra note 3 (discussing the
decades-long effort to pass ERISA).
81. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 31-34. Prior to ERISA, federal regulation of
private pensions consisted mainly of limited provisions of the IRC, the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1994)), and the Welfare and
Pensions Disclosure Act, Pub. L. 5-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1974). Before
1974, however, none of these Acts had as its focus the protection of individual plan
participants. See infra note 85 (discussing court decisions interpreting ERISA).
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640. The Report states that Congress designed ERISA to:
establish equitable standards of plan administration; mandate minimum
standards of plan design with respect to vesting of plan benefits; require
minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by requiring the amortization
of unfunded liabilities; insure the vested portion of unfunded liabilities
against the risk of premature plan termination; and promote a renewed
expansion of private retirement plans and increase the number of
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itself warns that "the continued well-being and security of millions
of employees and their dependents are directly affected by
[employee benefit] plans."8 3 The statute goes on to warn of
inadequate protections for such employees and their beneficiaries:
owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the
soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate
funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered [and] that
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have
been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have
been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore
desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries.., that minimum standards be provided
assuring the equitable
character of such plans and their
84
financial soundness.
Since ERISA's passage, multiple Supreme Court opinions
have cited ERISA's declaration of policy to invoke the need to
85
protect employees from benefit plan abuses.
Passed under Congress' interstate commerce, 8 6 taxation8 7 and
postal8 8 authorities, ERISA covers not just employer-sponsored

participants receiving private retirement benefits.
Id.

Some economic theorists suggest that regulation has in fact inhibited

expansion of private retirement plans. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 19, at

278-79.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
84. Id. Optimistic after its passage, Senator Jacob Javits of New York, the
law's primary sponsor, sounded a common sentiment, remarking that "the agony of
years of frustrated and disappointed beneficiaries has now come to an end. The
discipline of law will enable this and succeeding generations of workers to face
their retirement period with greater confidence and greater security." Quoted in
Francis X. Lilly, The Employee Retirement Incone Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J. 603,
604 (1984).
85. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 113 (1989) (stating that
ERISA was passed "to safeguard employees from the abuse and mismanagement"
of pension funds); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (stating that
ERISA is "designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans"); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)
(stating that Congress enacted ERISA to provide safeguards "with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit] plans."); Alessi
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (stating one purpose of
ERISA is to ensure workers receive their promised benefits); Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1980) (stating that ERISA was
based on congressional findings that "the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these [benefit]
plans.") (internal quotations omitted).
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (noting that
plans utilize "instrumentalities of interstate commerce").
87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (noting that
plans "substantially affect the revenues of the United States because they are
afforded preferential.., tax treatment").
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (noting that
plans are "carried on by means of the mails").
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pensions but all benefit plans that employers, unions or both
sponsor. 89 Thus, the law encompasses health and disability
insurance plans as well as all varieties of profit-sharing plans,
including pensions. 90 Central to the law's pension provisions are
requirements for disclosure, reporting and establishment of
standards for plan fiduciaries. 91 Further, it requires vesting of
accrued benefits after significant service and sets minimum
standards for plan funding. 92 Finally, ERISA's broad preemption
93
of state law accentuates these sweeping provisions.

89. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994). The law is divided into four titles. Title I
covers definitions, scope, administrative requirements, remedies and penalties. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1169 (1994). Title II is subsumed in the IRC. See I.R.C. §§ 401409 (1994). Title III divides authority for implementation and administration
between the Departments of Labor and Treasury. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242
(1994). Finally, Title IV addresses plan termination and establishes the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, an insurance mechanism for under-funded pension
plans. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1994); see also Dana M. Muir, Changing the
Rules of the Game: Pension Plan Terminations and Early Retirement Benefits, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1034, 1035 (1989) (examining whether early retirement benefits are
among those that must be satisfied before terminating a plan); Wolfe, supra note
79, at 145 (critiquing the PBGC's protection of early retirement benefits).
Congress has liberally amended ERISA since 1974. The Multi-employer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), added provisions for multiemployer plans. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.),
imposed special rules on plans which pay a high proportion of benefits to officers
and executives. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat.
1426 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), addressed
issues of gender equity in pension benefits. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), added provisions requiring employers
to allow terminated employees to continue health insurance coverage. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), made several amendments including
accelerating the time period during which pension benefits must become vested.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), amended benefit
accrual guidelines. The Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 237 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.), revamped the system of insurance for terminated plans.
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003.
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); see also Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1105, 1107-60 (1988) (outlining unintended and detrimental effects of ERISA's
fiduciary duty requirement).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). ERISA preempts "any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id.; see
also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983) (holding that ERISA preempts
New York's Human Rights Law insofar as the state law prohibited practices lawful
under federal law). State workers' compensation and disability and unemployment
insurance laws are, however, generally exempted from preemption. See 29 U.S.C. §
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2. Accrued Benefits and Accrual Rates Under ERISA
ERISA's protection of accrued benefits prevents the abuses
94
that previously left employees without promised benefits.
Accrued benefits are those "determined under the plan and...
expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal
retirement age." 95 Plan participants have a non-forfeitable right to

accrued benefits. 96 Thus, employers may not reduce accrued
benefits nor enact plan amendments that reduce accrued
benefits. 97
ERISA also sets a floor for rates of benefit accrual,
prohibiting a plan from providing a reduced rate of accrual based
on a participant's age. 98 Further, the law establishes a minimum
rate at which benefits must accrue. 99 Such a requirement
addresses the pre-ERISA practice of crediting employees with
benefits only in their final years of service, which prevented many
from ever qualifying for a pension. 10 0
Despite prohibiting reductions in accrued benefits and
mandating minimum rates of benefit accrual, ERISA does not
contains a per se prohibition of reducing rates of future benefit
accrual. Instead, the statute mandates that plan sponsors provide
employees notice of any significant reduction in future accruals
that accompany plan amendments. 10 1 The notice does not need to
provide specific information to participants, but may simply
summarize the effects of the amendment on all plan
participants.

102

1003(b)(3) (1994).
94. See supra note 79.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1994).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994).
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H) (1994).
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1) (1994). The statute provides for three different
rates at which an employee's expected retirement benefit must accrue during each
year of employment. See id.
100. See FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supra note 17, at 4.
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)(1) (1994). The statute reads that a plan may not be

amended:
so as to provide for a significant reduction in the rate of future benefit
accrual, unless, after adoption of the plan amendment and not less than 15
days before the effective date of the plan amendment, the plan
administrator provides a written notice, setting forth the plan amendment
and its effective date, to... each participant in the plan ....
Id.
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-6 (1996). The regulations require that "the
summary need not explain how the alternate benefit of each participant... will be
affected by the amendment." Id. The notice, however, must be written in such a
way as to be "understood by the average plan participant." Id.
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ERISA and Age Discrimination

ERISA's age discrimination provisions are limited in their
scope. The law prescribes guidelines for minimum participation,
and requires that employers refrain from excluding employees
from a plan beyond the later of age twenty-one or the completion of
one year of service. 10 3 Further, ERISA prohibits the exclusion 1of
04
otherwise eligible participants from a plan based on age.
Finally, ERISA establishes a normal retirement age at which
employers must pay benefits out. 105
B. IRC
Before ERISA, the law regulated pension plans largely via
tax policy under the IRC.106 Today, ERISA and the IRC overlap in
many of the protections that they provide. 107 The IRC differs from
ERISA and the ADEA because compliance with its pension plan
Because of the tax
provisisions is essentially optional. 08
advantages associated with compliance, however, most employers

103. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A) (1994).
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (1994).
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1994). The law requires that benefits be paid:
not later than the 60th day after the latest of the close of the plan year in
which(1) occurs the date on which the participant attains the earlier of age 65 or
the normal retirement age specified under the plan,
(2) occurs the 10th anniversary of the year in which the participant
commenced participation in the plan, or
(3) the participant terminates his service with the employer.
Id. Thus, while employers may pay benefits earlier, they may not delay
payment beyond the later of ten years of service or age sixty-five for
terminated employees.
106. See supra note 7.
107. These include vesting, minimum funding, and accrual guidelines. See
MCGILL, supra note 3, at 44.
108. See id.; see also Hollingshead v. Parmer, 747 F. Supp. 1421, 1434 (M.D. Ala.
1990) (noting that ERISA does not compel compliance with IRC for purposes of
receiving tax advantages but adding that "tax consequences of not qualifying are so
severe that practical considerations generally force employers to qualify their
plans"). Using the tax code as a pension policy tool does not come without criticism.
See generally Richard J. Kovach, A Critique of SIMPLE-Yet Another Tax-Favored
Retirement Plan, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 401 (1998) (faulting a recent pension
innovation for small employers while continuing to constrain individual choice in
retirement security); Deborah M. Weiss, PaternalisticPension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theoiy, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991) (linking
paternalistic pension policy, in the form of favorable tax treatment, to the
inconsistency between age and individuals' savings preferences); Graetz, supra note
17 (evaluating the efficacy of retirement security linked to tax policy); Richard G.
Schreitmueller, Get the IRS out of Pension Plan Regulation, PENS. & INV., Mar. 9,
1998, at 14 (arguing that the IRS's chief goal of revenue collection is inconsistent
with seeking effective pension plan operation).
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opt to abide by the IRC provisions.' 09 In fact, the pension fund
deduction that employers receive is the largest net tax outflow in
the federal budget. 110
1.

General Provisions for Qualified Plans

Pension funds that meet the IRC's requirements for
"qualification,"'' enjoy a tax deduction for contributions to the
plan. 1 2 They also generally receive tax-exempt status for the
plan's assets. 113 Among the requirements for qualification are that
the funds for payment of pension benefits be held in trust" 4 and
that the funds be used for the exclusive benefit of plan
participants.' 15 Further, the IRC defines minimum employee
participation standards 16 and requires that plans not discriminate
The IRC also
in favor of highly-compensated employees."17
requires that the plan sponsors offer certain annuity options to
married participants"18 and that annual payments from qualified
plans not exceed certain limits. 19

State tax laws often impose
109. See MCGILL, supra note 3, at 31-34.
requirements on pension sponsors that are similar to those of the federal tax code,
see id., though this Article only addresses the federal tax code.
110. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 109-11 (2000).
The deduction for the 2000 fiscal year was estimated at $88 billion, far exceeding
the next highest, the deduction for employer-sponsored health insurance, at $75
billion. See id.
111. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994). A pension fund, or "trust," is referred to as a
"qualified trust" if certain requirements are met. See id. Such funds are commonly
referred to as "qualified plans." Section 404 limits deductibility generally to those
contributions made by an employer necessary to meet the fund's minimum funding
standards. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (1994); see also I.R.C. § 412(a) (1994) (establishing
minimum funding standards); supra note 26 (discussing employers' obligation to
fund defined benefit plans to meet future pension obligations).
112. See 1.R.C. § 404(a) (1994).
113. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994). Exceptions to such an exemption are for-profit
organizations where all profits are payable to a non-profit entity, see I.R.C. § 502(a)
(1994), and, more relevant to pension trusts, entities that participate in prohibited
Generally, a prohibited transaction is a
transactions, see I.R.C. § 503(a).
preferential loan, compensation arrangement, or sale made to the pension plan
sponsor or a party with a financial, familial, or ownership connection to the
sponsor. See I.R.C. § 503(b)(1)-(6).
114. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1) (1994).
115. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1994). This is analogous to ERISA's fiduciary duty
requirement. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
116. See I.R.C. § 410 (1994). The standards are identical to ERISA's minimum
age requirements for participation. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying
text.
117. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 404(a)(2), 414(q) (1994).
118. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (1994).
119. See I.R.C. § 415 (1994).
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2. Accrued Benefits and Accrual Rates Under the IRC
The IRC's accrual guidelines are identical to those of
ERISA.120 The Code mandates specific minimum rates at which
benefits must accrue. 121 Further, accruals may not be ceased
based on a participant's age. 122 Finally, those benefits that have
already accrued to a participant may not be reduced. 123
3. Cash-Balance Plans and the IRC
While neither ERISA nor the ADEA specifically addresses
cash-balance plans, 124 the IRS has recognized the plans'
existence. 25 Despite this recognition, specific guidance has been
minimal. 126 IRS regulations do provide some guidance on benefit
accrual rates in cash-balance plans. 127 Garnering the most
attention from the IRS, however, has been the degree to which
cash-balance plans frontload their benefit accruals. 128 Consistent
with the accrual guidelines applied to traditional pension plans,
120. See supra note 99.
121. See I.R.C. § 411(b) (1994).
122. See I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) (1994).
123. See I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) (1994).
124. ERISA's sweeping inclusion of all employee benefit plans limits its
specificity with respect to particular plan types. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text. The ADEA provisions on age discrimination in employee
benefits are broad and do not address specific plan types. See infra notes 138-153
and accompanying text.
125. See I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
126. See Benefits Attorney Urges IRS Rules to Clarify Age DiscriminationIssues
in Conversions, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), at D-3 (Aug. 12, 1999), available at
Westlaw 8/12/1999 PBD d3. The IRS recently solicited comments from employees,

employers, and their representatives on issues related to cash-balance plans. See
I.R.S. News Release IR-99-97 (Oct. 19, 1999), availableat 1999 WL 956732.
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3) (1991); see also supra notes 121-122 and
accompanying text (discussing accrual rates in general under the IRC). Sections
411(a) and 417(e) have been applied to the calculation of lump-sum distributions
from cash-balance plans. See I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
128. See Memorandum from C. Ashley Bullard, District Director, IRS, to
3,
1999),
at
IRS
(Sept.
Employee
Plans
Division,
Director,
visited
(last
http://www.house.gov/bemie/legislation/ibm/letter_memo.html
September 15, 1999) [hereinafter Memorandum from C. Ashley Bullard]
(addressing a cash-balance plan that includes a declining benefit accrual rate).
Though the identity of the plan sponsor was omitted when the memo was made
public, reports indicate that it is Onan Corp., a subsidiary of Cummins Engine
Corp. See Colleen T. Congel, Firm's Conversion Disqualifies Plan; Court Should
Lift Exempt Status, IRS Says, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), at D-2 (Aug. 30, 1999),
The IRS's case is Seidlitz v.
available at Westlaw, 8/30/1999 PBD d2.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 334-99R (T.C. filed Aug. 13, 1999).
Participants in the plan have also filed a suit alleging that the conversion to a cash-

balance plan violated both ERISA and the ADEA. See Eaton v. Onan Corp., No.
19,
1997),
filed
May
(S.D.
Ind.
IP97-814-CH/G
http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/caseinfo.htm.
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rates
the IRS has thus far interpreted a plan that reduces accrual
129
with age as failing to meet the qualification requirements.
Recent testimony before Congress indicates that the IRS is
taking an increasingly cautious approach to cash-balance plan
Currently, all proposed conversions must 1be
conversions. 130
31
forwarded to the IRS's national office for a technical review.
Requiring the IRS's field offices to forward such matters is
considered the equivalent of a moratorium on plan conversions, at
least for the time being. 132
C.

The ADEA

Enacted in 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), as its name implies, was intended to prevent
discrimination in the workplace based on age. 133 Despite a healthy
economy prior to the law's passage, older workers found
themselves displaced from their jobs because of their age, and had
difficulty finding new work because of arbitrary age limits imposed
by employers.134 The statute prohibits age-based discrimination
"against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."'' 35 Notwithstanding the
decades-old ruling in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB136 that pensions
were conditions of employment and therefore subject to
bargaining, 137 broad protection of employee benefit plans for older
workers by the ADEA was not automatic.

129. See Memorandum from C. Ashley Bullard, supra note 128, at 8.
130. See Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 106th Cong., 15-27 (2000) (statement of Stuart L. Brown,
Chief Counsel, IRS) [hereinafter Hybrid Pension Hearings]. Brown explained that,
under the IRC, new cash-balance plans need not credit a participant with benefits
until the present value of his or her benefit under the new plan catches up to, or
"wears away," the present value of any benefit accrued under the old plan. See id.
at 16. This is entirely consistent with the protection of accrued benefits under both
ERISA and the IRC. See supra notes 94-97 and 120-123; see also supra note 63 and
accompanying text (discussing the financial aspects of the "wear-away").
131. See Hybrid PensionHearings, at 16.
132. See Jack L. VanDerhei, The Controversy of Traditional vs. Cash Balance
PensionPlans, ACA J., Fourth Quarter 1999 no. 4, at 7, 14.
133. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §
2(b), 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
134. See id. § 2(a).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
136. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.1949).
137. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining the court's holding
and the position of the NLRB).
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1. Initial Claims of Age Discrimination in Employee
Benefits
The ADEA addresses discrimination in employee benefits
with respect to both age of retirement and benefits related to age.
Its prohibition of a mandatory retirement age, restricted by a few
The provisions prohibiting
limited exceptions, is clear. 138
limitations on benefits related to age, however, have evolved over
the last twenty years. The original text of the ADEA specifically
exempted most employee benefit plans from inclusion in the
ADEA's protections. 139 Subsequent amendments modified the
ADEA to prevent involuntary retirement. 140 With regard to
identifying discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) adopted an equal cost justification for
varying benefits based on age.' 4 ' In Public Employees Retirement
System v. Betts,142 the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation.
The Court relied on the plain language of the statute 143 and its
44
interpretation of "subterfuge" in United Air Lines v. McMann,

138. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994). Section 623(f) allows use of age only as a
"bona fide occupational qualification." U.S.C. § 623(0(1); see also Western Airlines
v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 417 (1985) (holding that age is a bona fide occupational
qualification where it is a legitimate proxy for appropriate job qualifications in that
it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with older employees on an
individualized basis); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122 (1985)
(holding that age-based discrimination must relate to a "particular business" to
qualify for bona fide occupational qualification defense).
139. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §
4(f)(2), 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (exempting benefit plans so long as they were not "a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of... [the] Act").
140. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978), amended the ADEA to prohibit plans from
requiring or permitting "the involuntary retirement of any individual." 29 U.S.C.
623(f)(2)(A) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(7) (1999) (defining involuntary
retirement provisions as "a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act"). These
amendments overruled the decision in United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(1977), in which the Court interpreted "subterfuge" to mean "a scheme, plan,
stratagem, or artifice of evasion." Id. at 203. The court reasoned that the plan
provision in question, mandatory retirement at age sixty, was in effect prior to the
passage of the ADEA and thus could not be intended to evade the purposes of the
law. See id.
141. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d) (1988) (stating that "a plan... which prescribes
lower benefits for older employees on account of age is not a 'subterfuge'...
provided that the lower level of benefits is justified by age-related cost
considerations").
142. 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (involving a public pension plan that paid disability
retirement benefits to employees disabled before age 60, a difference of $159 per
month).
143. See id. at 175.
144. 434 U.S. 192; see also supra note 140 (discussing the definition of
subterfuge in McMann).
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holding that the ADEA regulated only hiring and firing and was
not intended to regulate employee benefits. 145 Thus, employers
based on age absent any subjective
could continue to vary benefits
46
intent to discriminate. 1
In 1990, in response to Betts, Congress passed the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act. 147 The legislation codified the
EEOC's previous "equal cost" or "equal benefit" approach to
discrimination in benefits. 148 Accordingly, the regulations now
provide for the use of "valid and reasonable" cost data to justify
Judicial
providing older employees with lower benefits. 149
interpretation of this cost justification is limited to relatively clear
15 0
cases where benefits are denied instead of simply reduced.
Thus, the 1990 amendments re-established the equal cost
justification, but guidance on its meaning has been limited.
2. Disparate Impact Under the ADEA
As a threshold issue, it is unlikely that the ADEA even
supports disparate impact claims of discrimination. '51 Both age
145. See Betts, 492 U.S. at 177-78 (citing McMann).
146. See Betts, 492 U.S. at 181. Violations of the ADEA are considered willful
where the employer either "knew or showed reckless disregard... [as to] whether
its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Air Line Pilolt's Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines,
713 F.2d 940, 956); see also Robinson v. County of Fresno, 882 F.2d 444, 446 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that plan sponsor's concession that age-based benefit reductions
were not motivated by economic reasons did not demonstrate intent to
discriminate).
147. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978 (1990).
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (1999) (providing that it is not unlawful for
employers to vary benefits based on age where "the actual amount of payment
made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or
incurred on behalf of a younger worker").
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(1) (1999) (providing for use of a "benefit-bybenefit" approach to evaluating cost in retirement plans). The provisions, however,
See §
address only denial of participation and not actual benefits.
1625. 10(f)(1)(B)(iii).
150. See AARP v. Farmers Group, Inc., 943 F.2d 996, 1001-05 (9th Cir. 1991)
(finding a violation of the ADEA where a sponsor provides no non-discriminatory
reason for denying benefits and was thus violative of the ADEA). Further, it held
that the sponsor had "made the entire benefits package as undesirable as possible
for persons over age 65." Id. at 1004.
151. The text of the statute supports this interpretation by allowing an employer
to differentiate among employees "based on reasonable factors other than age." 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994); see also Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703-04 (1st
Cir. 1999) (holding that "the ADEA does not impose liability under a theory of
disparate impact."), reh'g denied, 171 F.3d 710 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 68
U.S.LW. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996) (stating that "there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA
does not support a disparate impact claim."); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, Profl Staff
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and length of service, a factor that is often a function of age, enter
into calculating pension benefits. 15 2 The Supreme Court has held,
however, that employer decisions are not necessarily age-based if
based on a factor that is distinct from, even if correlated with,
153
age.
D. Current Proposalsfor Reform
The popularity of cash-balance plans and employers' rush to
convert existing plans has garnered Congress's attention. 54 In
1999, members of the House of Representatives introduced two
legislative proposals aimed at the cash-balance plan issue. 155 Both
address the mechanics of plan conversion and the potential losses
that older workers face. 156 One version would supplement the
existing notice requirements, 57 and would require an illustration
of plan participants' benefits under both the existing traditional
plan and proposed cash-balance plan.158 The other resolution goes
further and proposes amendments to both ERISA and the IRC to
address the "wearing away of an employee's accrued benefit."'159 It
would require an election by any employee so affected to either
convert to the new plan or to continue to accrue benefits under the

Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1995) (differentiating discrimination based on
age and discrimination based on seniority, pension status and high salary); EEOC
v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no violation
of the ADEA if an employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than
age, even if the motivating factors are correlated with age); DiBiase v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1995) (expressing opinion that it is
"doubtful" that ADEA supports disparate impact action); Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos
or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment Discriminationand the ADEA, 51
MERCER L. REV. 693 (2000) (discussing "chaotic" state of disparate impact under
the ADEA).
152. See supra notes 26-29, 42.
153. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993) (holding that
establishing a violation of the ADEA requires proof that age "actually motivated...
[and] actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on
the outcome."); see also Goldman v. First Nat'l. Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113,
1119-20 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that no inference of age bias could be made merely
on the basis of an employer's decision to convert to a cash-balance pension plan).
154. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
155. See Pension Right to Know Act, H.R. 1176, 106th Cong. (1999); Older
Workers Pension Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 2759, 106th Cong. (1999).
156. See H.R. 1176; H.R. 2759; see also supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the mechanics of plan conversion).
157. See H.R 1176 (discussing the current requirements under ERISA for notice
regarding significant reductions in accrual rates).
158. See H.R. 1176 § 2. The notice would need to project the accrued benefit and
its present value as of a date three, five, and ten years from the date of conversion.
See id.; see also supra note 33 (discussing the concept of present value).
159. H.R. 2759, at 1.
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old plan provisions.1 60 Both proposals have yet to make it out of

committee. 161
III. Cash-Balance Plans Exposed
A. How Older Workers Lose
From labor unions to Congress, academics to lawyers, highprofile opinions that employers' moves to convert to cash-balance
plans create injustice are not hard to find. 162 Hindering a concise
analysis of the issue, however, are the complicated provisions of
pension plans, 163 the technical financial aspects of cash-balance
conversions 164 and the reticulated nature of the three applicable
Aspects of finance, accounting, and
legislative schemes.165
a thorough discussion of the cashmake
actuarial methodology
may
master the intricacies of ERISA,
balance issue difficult. One
to
be
flummoxed by the results that a
only
the
ADEA
the IRC and
and earnings history create for
age,
service
specific combination of
situation in a cash-balance
individual's
one
an appraisal of
conversion scenario.
1. An Illustrative Hypothetical
To overcome the complexity of pension mechanics, it is
helpful to draw on the average figures discussed above, 6 6 and to
create two hypothetical employees. Hypothetical employee one is
between the ages of twenty-six and thirty and the other is between
the ages of fifty-six and sixty.
According to the average benefit amounts in Table 1, the
younger worker's accrued benefit under a cash-balance plan would

160. See id. § 2(a). In the case of the IBM conversion, see supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text, the California Public Retirement System CCALPERS") recently
supported such a measure. See IBM Workers Get Backer in Pension Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, March 28, 2000, at C27. CALPERS, holder of 9.2 million IBM shares,
announced plans to vote its shares in favor of a shareholder resolution requiring
the company to give all of its employees the choice to remain in the old plan. See
id. A representative of the pension fund called the withdrawal of "promised
benefits... not only morally reprehensible... [but also] plain bad business." Id.
161. Both have been referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and the
Committee on Education and the Workforce. The most current legislative history
is available on the Internet. See CIS Congressional Universe, http://web.lexisnexis.com/congcomp (last visited Aug. 29, 2000).
162. See supra notes 11, 12, 154, 161 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. See supra Part II.D.
165. See supra Part II.
166. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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be $8,490 and would represent approximately 23.3% of final
average pay. 167 The same worker's benefit under a FAP plan
168
would only be $1,151, representing 3.9% of final average pay.
Such a worker would realize an overall reduction in benefits if he
or she worked for the same employer and participated in the same
plan beyond the age of fifty-five. That is, she could expect overall
greater benefits under the FA-P plan over the course of an entire
career. Until the age of fifty-five, however, the conversion from a
traditional plan to a cash-balance plan would allow the younger
worker to accrue higher pension benefits in a shorter period of
time.
The opposite is true for the older worker. The older worker's
benefit under the FAP plan would be $83,272, representing
206.5% of final average pay. 169 Unlike the younger worker, the
older worker's FAP benefit would exceed the benefit in a new cashbalance plan, in this case $55,200.170 Certainly, an employer
would not simply reduce the older employee's benefit. 171 However,
the difference in accrual patterns after age fifty-five between the
two plans demonstrates how older workers lose. 172 It is important
to note that the older worker, nearer retirement than the younger
worker, would likely not be contemplating a job change. Thus, he
would be expecting to retire under the traditional FAP plan. Even
though the older worker's accrued benefit would not be reduced,
the older worker would not accrue the benefit he was expecting.
While the same reduction would apply to younger workers, they
would presumably have the intention of changing jobs anyway,
73
and would thus reap the benefits of earlier accruals. 1

167. See supra note 50 and accompanying tabular material.
168. See supra note 50 and accompanying tabular material.
169. See supra note 50 and accompanying tabular material.
170. See supra note 50 and accompanying tabular material.
171. This would run afoul of the accrued benefit protections of ERISA and the
IRC. See supra notes 94-97, 120-123 and accompanying text. Given the sizeable
worth of the pension fund tax deduction, it is very unlikely that an employer would
See supra note 108 and
so blatantly subject a plan to disqualification.
accompanying text.
172. See supra note 53 and accompanying tabular material. A brief glance at the
numbers demonstrates that retirees, those fifty-six and older, accrue more each
year under the FAP plan than under the cash-balance plan, while the opposite is
true for those age fifty-five and younger. See supra note 53 and accompanying
tabular material.
173. The "portable" aspects of cash-balance plans and employers' admitted
interest in attracting young and mobile workers support this conclusion. See supra
notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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2.

Reduced Future Accruals and the Wear-Away

The move to a cash-balance plan reduces the rate of future
pension accruals specifically for older employees. First, most
employers state a desire to attract and retain younger workers as
174
If
at least one motivation for the move to cash-balance plans.
175
the move represents a cost savings, but pays younger employees
higher benefits, 176 it follows that older workers lose. This is the
result of a reduction in future accruals. While the traditional FAP
model was designed to value long-term service by weighing benefit
accruals toward the end of an employee's tenure, 177 the cashbalance model does just the opposite. Thus, while older employees
may have expected a certain level of future accrual, the move to
This
cash-balance plans circumvents this expectation. 7 8
disappointment may be particularly troublesome for individuals
who have made long-term financial plans based on expected future
79
accruals. 1
Older workers also lose in cash-balance conversions when
they accrue benefits in neither the old plan nor the new cashbalance plan. Some employers convert to cash-balance plans by
using the present value of participants' accrued benefits as the
opening account balance.180 Where the plan calculates the opening
balance as if the cash-balance plan had always existed,' 8' older
employees may lose. Because cash-balance plans skew accruals to
the early part of a career,18 2 it follows that older employee's
accrued benefits calculated as if the cash-balance plan had always
been in effect will likely exceed those accrued under the old plan.
When employers convert by assuming that the cash-balance plan
had always existed, they can cease accruals for these employees, at
least until the point at which the old plan benefit would exceed the
new one. Thus, older workers' benefits are frozen while younger
workers begin accruing benefits under a new, more lucrative plan.

174. See supra notes 68, 70 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 50, 53 and accompanying tabular material.
179. For example, employees may vary their contributions to a 401(k) plan or
individual retirement account based on the expected benefits from a defined benefit
pension.
180. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 50, 53 and accompanying tablular material (showing the
benefit value and final payouts of each plan).
182. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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The mechanics of the wear-away are very apparent in the
hypothetical discussed above. 183 For the older worker who is
between the ages of fifty-six and sixty, the benefit under the FAP
plan exceeded that under the cash-balance plan. 8 4 While an
employer would not reduce the accrued benefit, 8 5 the employer
could cease crediting the employee with pay and service until the
value of benefits under the new plan equaled the value of benefits
under the old plan. While the average worker between fifty-six
and sixty would have expected a retirement benefit at age sixtyfive of $78,382,186 even though the accrued benefit under the old
plan would be preserved, the switch to the cash-balance plan
would prevent future accruals for a certain period of time. While
not reducing older workers' benefits directly, the wear-away
effectively freezes them from participating in the new pension
plan. And all of this takes place while younger workers enjoy a
187
windfall in pension accruals.
3.

Transitional Benefits

The transitional benefits that employers provide can also be
insufficient for many plan participants.
To be sure, most
employers recognize the potential loss that older employees face
and seek to ameliorate it by allowing some to remain in the old
plan.18 8
No matter where this cutoff lies, however, some
employees will always lose. For example, the data in Table 1
illustrates that the present value of benefits under a FAP plan
begins to exceed benefits under the cash-balance plan for
employees between the ages fifty-one and sixty. 8 9
Because
benefits will always be different for individuals of different ages
with varying service and salary histories, pinpointing an exact age
at which the FAP benefit begins to exceed the cash-balance benefit
is impossible. And the complexity of pension calculations prevents
most employees from calculating expected benefits under both
plans. While employers seek to minimize this loss, it seems
antithetical to the vast protections that pension beneficiaries
otherwise enjoy to allow any loss where there is an alternative.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supraPart III.A1.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94-97, 120, 123 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying tabular material.
See supra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying tabular material.
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4.

Other Concerns

Besides the concerns raised by the unique financial aspects of
cash-balance conversions, the changes also bring with them
practical concerns. While these do not focus directly on the age
disparities discussed above, they certainly do not ameliorate the
effects of an already suspect development. Cash-balance plans
and the conversion from traditional plans, if not the entire topic of
retirement security, are complicated. Despite employers' belief
that cash-balance plans increase the ease with which pension
benefits are communicated to employees, 190 the issues surrounding
conversion likely do just the opposite. Further, the cash-balance
scheme's reliance on the fiction of an individual account, 191 though
perhaps understood fully by some employees, clouds the topic by
injecting artifice. In addition to the potential for communication
difficulties, the move to cash-balance plans increases the
likelihood that a given employee will have the option to receive192a
lump-sum pay-out at the termination of his or her employment.
While this is beneficial to those individuals savvy enough to invest
for the long-term and insure financial security in retirement, it
may increase the chances of squandering retirement savings
before actual retirement.
Thus, cash-balance plans present issues related both to age
disparity and practical difficulties in ensuring retirement security.
The laws that govern the arena, however, appear ill-suited to
effectively manage the dangers.
B. ERISA Issues
Despite the clarity of its purpose, ERISA provides inadequate
protections for workers affected by conversions to cash-balance
plans. Employer abuses such as firing employees on the verge of
vesting or making capricious plan amendments to deny employees
accrued benefits first prompted ERISA's passage. While the move
to cash-balance plans is similar to these abuses in that it, in effect,
changes the rules in the middle of the game, it is not technically
inconsistent with ERISA's guidelines. First, ERISA's explicit age
discrimination provisions simply require participation after a
certain combination of age and service, 193 and forbid exclusion
from participation based on age. 194 Cash-balance plans, while
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
See supra.note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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raising the age-specific issues discussed here, do not completely
exclude participants on the basis of age. 195
Cash-balance plans, and the conversion thereto from
traditional plans, also do not violate ERISA's provisions regarding
benefit accrual. Because plan participants maintain the benefits
they accrued under the old plan, there is no violation of ERISA's
protection of accrued benefits. To be sure, cash-balance plans
196
typically reduce future rates of accrual for older employees.
However, ERISA does not forbid such reductions. While there is a
prohibition of linking accrual rates to age, 197 future rates of
accrual can always be reduced provided the plan sponsor provides
adequate notice. 198 While it is tempting to infer that conversion to
a cash-balance plan does indeed result in accrual reductions based
on age, this is simply not the case. As stated earlier, a cashbalance plan credits plan participants with benefits based on
service and pay. 199 While service is likely correlated with age, age
is not an explicit element of the benefit formula. Thus, while the
conversion to a cash-balance plan results in a de facto reduction in
accruals for older employees, it does not violate ERISA.
C. IRC Issues
Although the IRS has become increasingly critical of cashbalance plans, the protections that the IRC provides are unclear at
best and inadequate at worst. The IRC's provisions are deserving
of scrutiny because of the sizeable tax benefit that they allow
pension plan sponsors to enjoy. 200 But, like ERISA, the IRC only
20 1
prohibits reductions in accrued benefits and age-based accruals.
Again, cash-balance plans do not result in per se reductions in
accrued benefits. In addition, any reductions in future accruals
are not directly linked to age.
Despite apparent compliance with the IRC, however, cashbalance plans have garnered increased attention from the IRS.
There has been some effort to limit excessive frontloading of
benefits, 20 2 a practice that benefits younger workers at the expense
195. ERISA's preemption of all state laws precludes any claims regarding a cashbalance conversion under a breach of contract theory. See. supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
196. See supra Part III.A12.
197. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
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of older workers. These efforts, and the resulting effective
moratorium on conversions, 20 3 signal the IRS's feeling that the
topic at least requires further investigation. Further, it appears
that the wear-away scenario discussed above 204 is entirely
consistent with the tax code. Because it does not result in
reductions in accrued benefits and does not reduce accrual rates on
2
the basis of age, it does not violate the IRC. 05

D. ADEA Issues
Of the three legislative schemes that the cash-balance issue
invokes, the ADEA presents, on its face, the best prospect for
relief. The ADEA's provisions focus on age, and, unlike ERISA
and the IRC, are unclouded by the financial and actuarial
complexities of benefit accruals. Unfortunately, judicial treatment
of the ADEA in the context of a cash-balance conversion prevents
such an application.
The "equal cost or equal benefit" justification for age-based
disparity in employee benefits makes showing a conversion to a
cash-balance plan violative of the ADEA quite difficult. Employers
do not attempt to disguise the fact that conversions to cashbalance plans are in part motivated by cost savings. 206 Further,
employers change benefits for all employees and do not deny some
benefits based on age. 207 Thus, although the reductions in accrual
patterns associated with cash-balance plans reduce costs
specifically for older employees, cash-balance plans do not possess
the hallmarks of an ADEA violation. 208
It is also doubtful that the results of cash-balance conversions
would satisfy the ADEA's requirements for a showing of employer
action based on age. As noted above, cash-balance plans calculate
benefits on the basis of pay and service rather than age. 20 9 The
ADEA requires that employment decisions be based on age, not
merely correlated with age. 210 The Supreme Court has already
ruled against an inference of age bias from the conversion to a
cash-balance plan. 211 Further, the Court has clarified that, in
203. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
204. See supraPart III.A.2.
205. See supra note 130 (noting the concurrence of the IRS's lead counsel with
this interpretation).
206. See supranote 71 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 150.
208. See supraPart III.A.3.
209. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 153.
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employee benefit matters, decisions must be explicitly agebased. 212 Because the decision to convert to a cash-balance plan is
made for all employees and, typically, on the basis of cost savings
and workforce development, 213 it is unlikely that it would fall
under the protections if the ADEA. Further, the law's near
foreclosure of disparate impact claims for age discrimination
supports the likelihood that cash-balance conversions do not
violate the ADEA.214
E. Prospectsfor Reform
Both the Pension Right to Know Act, 215 and the Older
Workers Pension Protection Act of 1999,216 make some progress
toward resolving the shortcomings of ERISA, the IRC and the
ADEA with respect to cash-balance pension plans. However, in
addition to being only proposals and not actually law, both present
inadequacies of their own.
When evaluating pension policy, one should not ignore the
sharp reduction in pension plan sponsorship in the latter part of
the twentieth century. While evidence is mixed, there is some
support for the proposition that ERISA and its progeny actually
resulted in a net decline in plan participation because of the
increased burden of regulatory compliance. 21 7
Thus, when
evaluating a policy proposal, one should not ignore the very real
possibility that increased burdens will simply result in employers'
abdication of their traditional role in ensuring retirement security.
The move toward lower cost options such as defined contribution
and cash-balance plans is some evidence of employers' cost
21
consciousness. 8
The Pension Right to Know Act addresses some of the
complexities of the cash-balance issue but fails to specifically
address the shortcomings of existing legislation.
Its notice
requirements would be helpful in demonstrating complex plan
changes to plan participants. 2 19 Such a provision, however, would
achieve only a partial victory. Plan participants would be made
aware of impending changes and would be able to see the changes'

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
H.R. 1176, 106th Cong. (1999).
H.R. 2759, 106th Cong. (1999).
See supra note 18.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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specific impacts on their benefits. 220 The proposal, however, would
place the burden on employees to collectively oppose such changes.
Given the success of IBM employees in publicizing their situation
and garnering congressional attention, 22 1 it is unclear how the
proposal would improve the current situation. The Pension Right
to Know Act would succeed in making an incremental change that
would not impose significant additional costs on plan sponsors.
But the minimal protections it would provide would likely not be
sufficient.
Pension Protection Act would
The Older Workers
theoretically pick up where the Pension Right to Know Act leaves
off. By amending the ERISA and the IRC, 222 it would fill the gap
left by all three of the current legislative schemes. Requiring all
plan participants to opt into either the old or new plan would
clearly eliminate the loss of future benefits that older workers
experience. Further, because new employees would have only the
cash-balance option if their employment began after the
conversion date, employers could still phase out traditional plans,
albeit over a longer period of time. This longer period of time,
however, would eliminate the immediate cost savings that
employers seek. Thus, the Older Workers Pension Protection Act,
while stifling the move to conversion, might result in increased
costs and a net reduction in pension coverage. Notwithstanding
this danger, the proposal is still the only one pending that
addresses the shortcomings of existing law in preventing agebased inequalities in cash-balance pension plans.
Conclusion
Pensions are complicated instruments both for ensuring
financial security in retirement and for various employer
prerogatives seemingly unrelated to this goal. Abuses in the
private pension system prompted the passage of comprehensive
regulatory provisions in the 1970s, and attention to the
importance of continued prevention has prompted ongoing
additions to the legislation. The recent move toward cash-balance
plans results from demographic changes in the workforce and
employers' need to reduce costs and attract and retain younger
workers.

220. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
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The move to cash-balance pensions, however justified, can be
The potential for devaluing the
harmful to older workers.
pensions of those most vulnerable to financial fluctuations is
inconsistent with the policies that underlie the pension regulatory
scheme. Unfortunately, the protections that the law provides are
unclear and sometimes inadequate. Proposals for reform make
some progress toward enhancing these protections but may not go
far enough. Just as the attention to the abuses of old prompted
comprehensive protections, it is hoped that the more nuanced
abuses of today will garner sufficient attention so as to also
prompt appropriate protections.

